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The present study aimed to investigate whether a brief rea-
soning training module changes the ‘‘jumping to conclu-
sions’’ data gathering bias in people with delusions. A
secondary aim was to examine whether improvements in
reasoningwouldlead to greaterﬂexibilityin thinkingabout
delusions. It was found that people with delusions and a di-
agnosis of schizophrenia (n 5 34) requested less informa-
tion on a reasoning task compared with a nonclinical
control group (n 5 34). The clinical group was then ran-
domly allocated to a session of reasoning training or to
an attention control condition. Following training, partic-
ipants showed a significant increase in data gathering, and
asmallnumberreportedmoreflexibilityandlessconviction
in their delusions, although this finding was not significant.
The presence at baseline of an extreme reasoning bias mod-
erated the effect of training. The study provides further
confirmation of the jumping to conclusions bias and shows
that data gathering can be improved, though the severest
form of the bias is resistant to change. It is recommended
that lengthier, delusion-related reasoning packages be de-
veloped and evaluated.
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Introduction
Delusionsare akey symptomofschizophrenia, occurring
in approximately three-quarters of cases.
1 They are fre-
quently distressing and disabling, and existing treatments
are only partially effective. Many patients with schizo-
phrenia show a relatively poor response to antipsychotic
medication,
2,3 with approximately 50% of patients dem-
onstrating persistent delusions even after the first acute
psychotic episode has abated.
4 Recent research indicates
that the effects of antipsychotic medication on delusional
conviction, in particular, are less marked than on other
aspects of delusions, such as associated distress and be-
havioral response.
5 Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT)
forpsychosiswasinitiallydevelopedtoimprovethetreat-
ment of persistent distressing delusions and hallucina-
tions, and meta-analyses consistently indicate that this
new intervention does show efficacy but that the effects
are small to moderate.
6–8 Although antipsychotic medi-
cationandCBT,therefore,bothhavebenefits,thegoalof
delivering sustained improvement in delusions remains.
Better treatments are needed, based on a sound under-
standing of cause and maintenance.
Over the last 10 years, delusions have become a focus
of cognitive theories and empirical research and are con-
sidered to result from a number of interacting biological,
psychological, and social factors.
9–14 One factor high-
lighted has been reasoning biases.
15–18 Delusions have
been shown with particular consistency to be associated
with reduced data gathering and belief inflexibility (see
reviews
19–21). In this article, we report the first experi-
mental study to focus on an attempt to reverse these
biases and inspect the impact on delusional thinking.
Reduced Data Gathering and Belief Inﬂexibility
Reduced data gathering in individuals with delusions has
been repeatedly demonstrated using probabilistic reason-
ing tasks based on a Bayesian model of probabilistic in-
ference.
22–28 On a typical probabilistic reasoning task
(the beads task), participants are asked to request as
many pieces of evidence (colored beads) as they would
like before making a decision (from which of 2 hidden
jars the beads are drawn). The participants are shown
that the jars have beads of 2 different colors and are in-
formed of the proportions of each colored bead in the
jars. In the original version of the task, one jar has 85
black beads and 15 yellow beads and the other jar has
the opposite ratio of black and yellow beads. In a
more difficult version, the beads are in the ratio 60:40.
The key variable employed is the number of items re-
quested before making a decision. Individuals with delu-
sions request fewer beads before making their decision
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form of the bias—‘‘jumping to conclusions’’ (JTC)—has
been operationalized as when a decision is made after 2
or fewer beads. Approximately 40% of people with delu-
sions jump to conclusions even when the beads are in the
difficult ratio of 60:40.
16
The JTC bias has been replicated widely, using various
modifications of the basic paradigm, not only in people
with delusions but also in people who have recovered
from delusions, people at risk of delusions, and people
with delusion proneness in the general population (see re-
cent reviews
17,20,21). That the bias is present in at-risk
populationsandinremittedgroups,althoughinanatten-
uated form, suggests it is a trait representing liability to
delusions but that it may in addition be exacerbated in
acute delusional states.
16,24,26,29 Taken together, this re-
search indicates that this bias is a trait that may contrib-
ute to both delusion formation and persistence. The
evidence also shows that this is a data gathering bias
rather than a deficit in probabilistic reasoning.
19 The rea-
soning bias is specifically associated with level of delu-
sional conviction.
16,25,30 In a novel line of research, it
has recently been shown to moderate the response to an-
tipsychotic treatments in a drug-naive group of patients
with a first episode of psychosis, such that those with an
extreme JTC bias showed a poorer treatment response.
27
The mechanism for this bias, however, is not yet clear, and
various proposals have been made: eg, Moritz et al
31 have
proposed that it represents a reduced threshold for accep-
tance of a hypothesis (a liberal acceptance bias), and
Broome et al
29 have suggested that it might be related
to impaired working memory and intolerance of uncer-
tainty,althoughconsistentevidence hasnot yetbeenfound
to support any of these hypotheses. The relationship of
JTC to the well-attested cognitive impairments of schizo-
phrenia(suchasattention,memory,andexecutivefunction
deficits) has yet to be examined systematically. It should
be notedthat JTC differsfrom these cognitive impairments
in schizophrenia in that, unlike them, it has been shown
to be specifically related to delusional symptoms.
A related empirical literature shows that many individ-
uals with delusions produce few alternative explanations
for the evidence cited for their beliefs,
32 do not think that
they could be mistaken in their belief,
33 and report that
they would not change their belief in a hypothetical con-
tradictiontask.
34Thesefindingshaverecentlybeenincor-
porated into the concept of belief flexibility. Belief
flexibility refers to ‘‘a meta-cognitive process about
thinking about one’s own delusional beliefs, changing
them in the light of reflection and evidence and generat-
ing and considering alternatives (Garety et al).
16(p374)
There have been indications that belief flexibility predicts
a positive response to both antipsychotic medication
35
and CBT.
33,36,37 We recently found evidence that belief
inflexibility mediates the effect of JTC on delusional con-
viction.
16 It is proposed that JTC limits belief flexibility
thereby maintaining and escalating levels of delusional
conviction. Therefore, it is possible that reducing JTC
may have a more immediate effect on belief flexibility
than on delusional conviction.
The clinical implications of this research for psycholog-
ical therapy for psychosis are apparent, as we previously
argued: ‘‘we believe that reducing the conviction . with
which delusions are held, and protecting against future re-
lapse should be assisted by targeting the meta-cognitive
processes of reflection on delusions, thus eliciting ways
of opening up new possibilities in thinking. This will in-
volve attention to all-or-nothing thinking, data gathering
andthecarefulconsiderationandgenerationofalternative
explanations’’ (Garety et al).
16(p382) Clinically, therefore, we
propose that if a data gathering bias and belief inflexibility
lead to high levels of delusional belief conviction and
greater delusional persistence, then methods of changing
the biases will be of therapeutic benefit. Theoretically, if
changing reasoning style alters delusional ideation, this
willsupport the claims of cognitive modelsthat hypothesize
that reasoning has a causal role in delusions.
The Study
The aim of the study was to investigate whether a newly
developed reasoning training module induces changes in
datagatheringinpeoplewithadiagnosisofschizophrenia-
spectrumdisorder andcurrentdelusions. A secondaryaim
was to explore whether improvements in reasoning would
lead to improvements in flexibility in thinking about delu-
sions. It was hypothesized that
1. Individuals with delusions will request less informa-
tion than individuals without delusions on probabilis-
tic reasoning tasks (ie, will ‘‘JTC’’).
2. Individuals with delusions who receive brief reasoning
training will show improvement on general reasoning
as measured by the probabilistic reasoning task (data
gathering) compared with individuals with delusions
who receive no reasoning training.
3. Reasoning training will lead to greater belief flexibility
associated with the delusion as assessed by asking
about the possibility of being mistaken, the response
to hypothetical contradiction, and the production of
alternative explanations.
Itwasalsoplannedtoexaminewhethertrainingreduced
delusionalconviction.However,becausedelusionalbeliefs
are strongly and persistently held, it was considered un-
likely that one training session would lead to significant
and immediate reductions in delusion conviction.
Methods
Participants
Individuals with current delusions and a schizophrenia-
spectrum disorder were recruited from mental health
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serving apopulation of approximately one million inhab-
itants, the South London and Maudsley NHS Founda-
tion Trust. Inclusion criteria were a case note diagnosis
of schizophrenia or schizoaffective or delusional disorder,
a current delusional belief held with at least 75% self-
rated conviction, aged 18–65 years, and fluent in English.
Individuals were excluded if they had primary diagnosis
of alcohol or substance dependence, organic syndrome
or learning disability, or a profound visual impairment.
Thirty-nine individuals meeting the criteria were referred
for the study. Four individuals declined to take part, and
one individual was excluded because of clinical concerns.
Nonclinical participants were matched on age, ethnicity,
and occupation with the clinical group. They were
recruited from a locally developed database containing
the names of people from the general population who
were willing to take part in research. In addition, partic-
ipants were recruited from temporary staff working in the
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust
and by ‘‘snowball’’ sampling. Individuals were excluded
fromthenonclinical group ifthey had a primary diagnosis
of organic syndrome, learning disability, profound visual
impairment, or nonfluent English or if they reported any
history of severe mental illness.
Design
The study was in 2 stages: first, we employed an indepen-
dent 2-group comparison, comparing the clinical and the
nonclinical groups’ performance on the probabilistic rea-
soning task; then we conducted a randomized experi-
ment, with only the clinical participants, who were
randomized either to the reasoning training intervention
or to an attention control activity, to compare changes
in reasoning, belief flexibility, and delusions before and
after intervention. All participants (clinical and nonclin-
ical) first completed assessments of intellectual function-
ing, anxiety, depression, and data gathering. The clinical
participants also completed assessments of belief flexi-
bility,detailedassessmentsofthemaindelusion,andgen-
eral psychopathology. The clinical participants were then
randomized to receive a 45-minute reasoning interven-
tion or to an attention control condition consisting of
a neuropsychological assessment of comparable dura-
tion. The same experimenter (K.R.) administered both
the training and the control conditions. After the admin-
istration of the experimental training or the control activ-
ity, the data gathering, belief flexibility, and delusion
assessments were repeated.
Randomization Procedure
The randomization schedule was generated using
www.randomisation.com and kept independently of
the experimenter. The experimenter was only informed
of the randomization allocation once the participant
had provided informed consent and an appointment
had been arranged for the testing.
Measures
Prerandomization. Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelli-
gence General intellectual ability was assessed using
the 2-subtest version of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale
of Intelligence (WASI) (vocabulary and matrix reason-
ing).
38 The 2-subtest version of the WASI takes approx-
imately 15 minutes to administer and provides an
estimation of full-scale IQ.
Positive and Negative Symptom Scale. The Positive and
Negative Symptom Scale is a 30-item semistructured in-
terview designed to assess positive, negative, and general
psychopathology associated with schizophrenia.
39
Respondents are asked to report the occurrence of symp-
toms over the last 7 days. These are then rated according
to severity on a 7-point scale (1–7, ‘‘absent–extreme’’).
Higher scores indicate a greater presence of symptoms.
The positive and negative subscales are each calculated
by summing 7 items, while the general subscale is calcu-
lated on the basis of 16 items.
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale. The Depression Anxi-
ety Stress Scale is a 42-item instrument with 3 subscales
measuring current symptoms of depression, anxiety, and
stress.
40 Each of the subscales consists of 14 items with
a 0–3 scale (0 = did not apply to me at all, 3 = applied
to me very much). Higher scores indicate higher levels
of emotional distress.
Pre- and Postintervention Tests and Measures (Clinical
Group Only). Probabilistic Reasoning Task The proba-
bilistic reasoning task (also known as the ‘‘Beads
Task’’) is a standard task used to assess data gathering.
16
Two computerized versions of the task were used. In ver-
sion 1 (the 60:40 task), one jar had 60 red beads and
40 blue beads and the other jar had 40 red beads and
60 blue beads. In version 2 (the 85:15 task), one jar
had 85 red beads and 15 blue beads and the other jar
had 15 red beads and 85 blue beads. In both versions
of the task, participants were shown pictures of the 2
jars and told that one of the jars would be selected at ran-
dom by the computer and that beads would be drawn
from the selected jar. After each bead was drawn, partic-
ipants were asked if they would like to see more beads (ie,
if they would like more information) or if they could say,
with certainty, from which of the jars the beads were be-
ing drawn. Once a bead had been drawn, it remained at
thebottomofthescreentherebyprovidingamemoryaid.
The key variable was the number of beads requested by
the participant before making a decision. JTC was clas-
sified as requesting 2 or fewer beads. Both versions of the
task (60:40 and 85:15) were administered before and after
completion of the training or control tasks, but the color
of the beads used in each version were changed from pre
to post administration.
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lief flexibility: possibility of being mistaken, reaction to
hypothetical contradiction, and alternative explana-
tions.
16,32 Two assessments were from the Maudsley As-
sessment of Delusions Scale,
34 as reported in Garety
et al.
16 The scale has good interrater reliability (mean
kappa = 0.82).
41 The clinical participants were asked
whether or not it was possible that they may be mistaken
about their beliefs (possibility of being mistaken, PM). A
positive response indicates belief flexibility. They were
also presented with a hypothetical but plausible scenario
which if true would contradict the delusion (‘‘reaction to
hypothetical contradiction,’’ RTHC)
35 and asked how
this would affect their belief. There are 4 response
options: to dismiss the belief; to decrease level of convic-
tion; to accommodate the hypothetical scenario into the
belief, leaving it unchanged; and to ignore or reject the
relevance of the scenario. The first 2 options are taken
to indicate belief flexibility. A third assessment of belief
flexibility was the reporting of alternative explanations
using the procedure described by Freeman et al.
32 The
evidenceforthedelusionwaselicited,andthen,inastruc-
tured assessment, participants are asked whether there
are any alternative explanations. One or more alternative
explanations represent belief flexibility.
Delusional Conviction. Delusional conviction was
assessed by asking participants to rate how strongly
they held the belief from 0% to 100%, where 0% was
‘‘do not believe’’ and 100% was ‘‘absolutely certain.’’
Reasoning Training Intervention
The training used engaging material of a neutral content
and aimed to convey the overall idea that it is preferable
nottoreachadecisiontooquickly.Participantswerepre-
sented with 3 training tasks, each lasting 15 minutes,
which aimed to illustrate reasoning biases and ways of
correcting them. It targeted data gathering, generation
andconsiderationofalternativeideas,andtheuseofcon-
firmatoryanddisconfirmatoryevidence.Twoofthetasks
(object identification and picture interpretation) were
adapted from previously devised modules of the meta-
cognitive training (MCT) package, designed for group
administration by Moritz et al,
42 described also in Moritz
and Woodward.
17 The third task, visual illusions, was
designed specifically for this study. The whole training
waspresentedusingMicrosoftPowerPointduringasingle
session lasting approximately 45 minutes. At no time was
the content of training discussed in relation to the partic-
ipants’ delusions or any aspect of the assessment. Each
task had 3 phases: presentation of stimuli and free re-
sponse, review of initial responses and instruction in rea-
soning, and further practice with additional stimuli.
Object Identiﬁcation. In this task, participants are
shownpicturesof10objects(eg,arockingchair,aflower,
afish),buteachobjectis revealedpiecebypieceover ase-
ries of 8 slides (one piece per slide). After each piece is
revealed, the participant is asked whether they would
like to see another piece of the picture (ie, whether
they wanted more information) or whether they could
say with certainty what the object was from 6 response
options provided on screen. As more pieces are revealed,
particular response options become less plausible. The
aim of the task is to encourage the participant to seek
more data before reaching a decision. Pictures of 5
objects were shown first. Once the participant had iden-
tified what they thought the object was, the first piece of
the next picture was presented. In the next phase, 2 of the
first pictures were reviewed with the participant and all
the pieces revealed. In some cases, this illustrated that
making decisions before they had all the available pieces
of the picture (ie, JTC) could lead to a wrong decision.
Following this training, participants were shown 5
more pictures and asked to request as many pieces as
they wished in order to say what the object was from 6
alternatives.
PictureInterpretation. Duringthistask,participantsare
shown pictures of 9 paintings and asked to identify the
correct title of each painting from 4 alternatives. The
aim of this task is to encourage participants to consider
the likelihood of each alternative title being correct based
on the content of the picture. In this way, participants are
discouraged from making hasty decisions based on insuf-
ficient evidence and to consider alternative hypotheses,
weighing up supporting and disconfirming evidence.
Four of the paintings were shown first and responses
recorded without any indication as to whether or not
they were correct. During the training phase, the baseline
pictures were reviewed. Participants were encouraged to
identify and discuss evidence contained in each painting
that would support or refute each of the corresponding 4
titles being correct. The correct title was identified as the
one with the most evidence to support it and the least
amountofevidencetorefuteit.Followingthefinalphase,
participants were presented with a further 5 pictures.
Again, participants were asked to say which of 4 possible
titles they thought was correct based on the evidence con-
tained in the picture.
Illusions. Intheillusionstask,participantsareshown11
classic images that can be perceived in 2 ways (eg, an old
or young woman). The aim of this task is to illustrate to
participants that there is often more than one way of see-
ing things, that first impressions can sometimes reveal
only half the truth, and therefore, that it is better to delay
a decision. Participants were initially shown 5 pictures.
On presentation of each picture, participants were asked
to say what they could see. Responses were recorded, and
the next picture presented. During the next phase, the ini-
tial pictures were reviewed and both the images in each
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shown a further 6 pictures and asked what they could see.
Attention Control Condition: Neuropsychological Tasks
Participants in the control condition were asked to com-
plete a series of neuropsychological tests and tasks, in to-
tal lasting for 45 minutes. The tests were intended to be as
engaging and cognitively demanding as the training con-
dition but to lack any reasoning training component. The
neuropsychological tests were the Hayling Sentence
Completion task,
43 the Brixton Spatial Anticipation
Test,
43 the Trail Making Test A and B,
44 the Cognitive
Estimates Test,
45 and the Wechsler Memory Scale Third
Edition—spatial span subtest.
46 Because they do not re-
late to the hypotheses of this study, results of these tests
are not reported.
Analysis and Sample Size Determination
Data were managed and analysed using SPSS for Win-
dows
47 and Stata Version 9.
48 Group differences were ex-
amined using t tests or linear regressions for dimensional
variables and chi square or Fisher tests for dichotomous
variables. For the principal test of the effects of training,
welooked at proportional changes in the number ofbeads
needed to come to a conclusion in the JTC tasks. To im-
plement this analysis, we investigated arithmetic differen-
ces on a logarithmic scale. For the JTC 60:40 task, we
created the contrast, C1, equal to ln(JTC60Post) 
ln(JTC60Pre) = ln(JTC60Post)/ln(JTC60Pre)—alogarithm
of a ratio—where ‘‘ln’’ means natural logarithm and
JTC60Post and JTC60Pre are the number of beads drawn
in the JT60 task postrandomization and prerandomization
(ie, at baseline), respectively. Similarly, for the JTC 85:15
task, we created the contrast C2 = ln(JTC85Post) 
ln(JTC85Pre). Finally, we assumed that the effect of the
experimental intervention would be the same for C1 and
C2, and a linear random-effects model was fitted using
Stata’s xtreg command to estimate this common effect
(in terms of the difference between the logarithms of ratios
for the 2 experimental groups). Finally, taking exponents
(antilogarithms) of the estimate and its corresponding
95% confidence limits produces an estimate and 95%
confidence limits for a ratio (the number of beads drawn
in the experimental condition divided by the number of
beads drawn by the controls, adjusting for chance differen-
ces between the groups at baseline). Two-tailed tests and
confidence intervals are reported throughout.
The sample size had been determined in the study pro-
tocol on the basis of a power calculation using nQuer-
yAdvisor.
49 The calculation concerned an estimate of
a group difference between the reasoning training and
the attention control clinical groups on the probabilistic
reasoning task following the intervention. Drawing upon
the data reported in Freeman et al,
32 it was expected that
there would be a group difference between allocation
conditions of 3 beads on the 85:15 task. This expected
group difference was divided by 3, the baseline SD
reported in previous beads studies, giving an effect
size of one. Therefore, it was calculated that 17 people
in each condition would be needed to detect such an ef-
fect with 80% power using a 2-tailed t test (significance
level = 0.05).
Results
Demographic and Clinical Data
Key demographic variables relating to the clinical and
nonclinical groups are presented in table 1. Participants
were matched on age and gender, but the nonclinical par-
ticipants had a higher IQ score than the clinical group, t
(df = 66) = 3.52, P = .001. All the clinical participants
hadacasenotediagnosisofschizophrenia.Furtherinfor-
mation on the clinical participants, reported by random-
ization condition, is shown in table 2.
Hypothesis 1: Data Gathering in the Clinical and
Nonclinical Groups
The individuals with delusions requested significantly
fewer beads on both the 60:40, t (df = 66) = 3.41,
P = .001, and 85:15, t (df = 66) = 2.70, P = .008, ver-
sions of the beads task than the nonclinical participants
(see table 3). These significant group differences on the
beads tasks remained after controlling for intellectual
functioning. In a linear regression with number of beads
drawn on the 60:40 task as the dependent variable, group
(delusion, nonclinical) was a significant predictor,
b = .295, SE = 1.152, P = .018, but not intellectual func-
tioning,b = .232,SE = 0.040,P = .060.Inalinearregres-
sion with number of beads drawn on the 85:15 task as the
dependent variable, group (delusion, nonclinical) was
a significant predictor, b = .295, SE = 0.682, P = .024,
but not intellectual functioning, b = .063, SE = 0.024,
Table 1. Demographic Data in Clinical (Delusional) and
Nonclinical Groups
Clinical (Delusion)
Group (n = 34)
Nonclinical
Group (n = 34)
Mean age, y (SD) 39.0 (10.2) 36.4 (12.2)
Gender
Male 25 (73.5%) 24 (70.6%)
Female 9 (26.5%) 10 (29.4%)
Ethnic group
White 17 (50%) 19 (55.9%)
Black Caribbean 13 (38.2%) 10 (29.4%)
Black African 1 (2.9%) 1 (2.9%)
Asian 0 2 (5.9%)
Other 3 (8.8%) 2 (5.9%)
Mean full-scale
IQ (SD)
98.2 (14.2) 109.7 (12.7)
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clinical participants JTC (ie, requesting 2 beads or
fewer) on the 60:40, v
2 (df = 1) = 6.07, P = .014, and
85:15, v
2 (df = 1) = 8.74, P = .003, versions of the beads
task were significantly higher than the numbers of non-
clinical participants. JTC on the 60:40 task was highly as-
sociated with JTC on the 85:15 task, v
2 (df = 1) = 32.98,
P < .001.
Table 3 also provides data on the mean scores, within
the clinical and nonclinical groups, of the subgroups
who jump to conclusion and those who do not. It will
be seen that the clinical group’s mean scores are all nu-
merically lower than the nonclinical group’s, including
in the subgroup of those who do not JTC, indicating
a tendency to gather less data than controls in this sub-
group also.
Hypothesis 2: Data Gathering After Reasoning Training
The number of beads drawn in the beads tasks before and
after randomization conditions are displayed in table 4.
There is an increase in beads drawn following training
but not following the attention control condition. Table 5
gives results on the number of people jumping to conclu-
sions, and here, it is notable that for both versions of the
beads task there is little change in the number of people
who jump to conclusions after training (ie, who show the
extreme reasoning style). This implies that the increases
inthenumberofbeadsdrawn(ie,datagathering)displayed
intable4weremostlyduetothepeoplewhodidnotjumpto
conclusions before randomization. In the training group,
thosewhojumpedtoconclusionsonthefirstadministration
ofthe60:40taskhaveameanimprovementinbeadsscoreof
0.44 (SD = 2.13), whereas those who did not jump to con-
clusionsonthefirstadministrationofthetaskhaveamean
improvementinbeadsscoreof4.00(SD = 4.04).Similarly,
on the 85:15 task, the mean improvement for people with
JTC was 0.72 (SD = 2.41), but the improvement was 1.67
(SD = 4.13)forthosepeoplewhodidnotshowJTC.Onav-
erage, all participants in the intervention group improved,
comparedwiththecontrols,buttheamountofimprovement
was dependent on their baseline measurement. Resulting
from this preliminary descriptive analysis, we decided to
evaluate the effect of the experimental intervention by esti-
matingtheproportionalincreaseinbeadsdrawn(expressed
asaratioofbeadsdrawnintheexperimentalconditionover
thenumberofbeadsdrawnbythecontrols),assumingthat
Table 2. Clinical Data by Randomization Condition
Training
Condition
(n = 17)
Control
Condition
(n = 17)
Mean length of illness (SD) 16.2 (9.0) 10.8 (10.2)
Status
Inpatient 1 (5.8%) 8 (47.1%)
Outpatient 15 (88.2%) 9 (52.9%)
Mean PANSS score (SD)
Positive scale 20.76 (3.63) 19.06 (3.78)
Negative scale 11.29 (3.19) 11.06 (4.41)
General scale 31.47 (6.38) 28.59 (4.73)
Delusion type
Persecutory 11 9
Grandiose 6 8
Mean % conviction in the
delusion (SD)
95.3 (9.3) 97.0 (6.8)
DASS anxiety 13.3 (12.1) 14.5 (10.9)
DASS depression 14.4 (12.5) 14.8 (14.0)
DASS stress 15.9 (11.2) 17.3 (13.5)
Mean full-scale IQ (SD) 95.8 (15.4) 100.7 (12.8)
Note: PANSS, Positive and Negative Symptom Scale; DASS,
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale.
Table3. BeadsTaskDatafortheClinicalandNonclinicalGroups
Probabilistic Reasoning Task
Clinical
Participants
(n = 34)
Nonclinical
Participants
(n = 34)
60:40 task
Mean (SD) 3.8 (3.9) 7.4 (4.9)
Median 2 8
Number JTC/non JTC 19/15 9/25
JTC subgroup mean (SD) 1.2 (0.4) 1.4 (0.5)
Non JTC subgroup mean (SD) 7.1 (3.9) 9.6 (3.8)
85:15 task
Mean (SD) 2.7 (2.3) 4.4 (2.8)
Median 2 4
Number JTC/non JTC 20/14 8/26
JTC subgroup mean (SD) 1.2 (0.4) 1.5 (0.5)
Non JTC subgroup mean (SD) 4.9 (2.1) 5.4 (2.6)
Note: JTC, jumping to conclusions.
Table 4. Data Gathering Pre- and Postrandomization Task
Beads Task
Training Condition
(n = 17)
Control Condition
(n = 17)
Pre Post Pre Post
60:40
Mean (SD) 3.4 (3.0) 5.5 (6.2) 4.1 (4.8) 3.4 (3.6)
Median 2 3 1 1
Number JTC 9 8 10 10
85:15
Mean (SD) 2.5 (2.2) 3.5 (3.9) 3.0 (2.4) 2.8 (2.8)
Median 1 1 2 1
Number JTC 11 11 9 10
Note: JTC, jumping to conclusions.
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inthe ‘‘Methods’’section, above). Weestimate that thein-
tervention increased the number of beads drawn by about
50% (compared with the controls)—the point estimate of
the ratio being 1.49 with 95% confidence interval (1.09,
2.03) (P = .012).
Hypothesis 3: Belief Flexibility After Training
Five of the individuals with delusions showed improved
belief flexibility at the postassessment indicated by a pos-
itive change of response on any of the 3 items (table 6).
Four of these participants were in the training condition,
and 1 participant was in the control condition, which is
not a significant difference, Fisher’s Exact test P = .335.
One participant in the training condition showed less be-
lief flexibility as assessed by the hypothetical contradic-
tion question (ignores or rejects relevance).
Effects of Training on Delusional Belief Conviction
For the training group, the mean level of delusional con-
viction changed from 95.3 (SD = 9.3) to 90.0 (SD = 20.0).
For the control group, the mean level of conviction was
unchanged before and after condition at 97.0 (SD = 6.84).
Three participants reported less conviction in their delu-
sional belief following training. In these cases, conviction
reduced from 100% to 30%, 100% to 90%, and from 75%
to 50%. One participant increased their conviction follow-
ing training from 75% to 90%. There were no changes in
the control group.
Discussion
The current study replicates the well-established data
gatheringbias amongpeople with delusionsand aclinical
diagnosis of schizophrenia. The participants with delu-
sions, a group with long-term illnesses and persistent
symptoms, were selected to have high levels of delusional
conviction. They requested less information than the
nonclinical participants without delusions before making
adecisiononbothversionsofthebeadstask.Over50%of
the clinical sample jumped to conclusions compared with
a quarter of the nonclinical sample. However, this study
was an attempt to move beyond demonstrating an associ-
ation of delusions and reasoning by investigating whether
the data gathering bias can be modified and assessing the
consequent effect on thinking about delusions.
A brief, single session training intervention had an ef-
fect on data gathering, reflected in a significant increase
immediately after training in the number of beads
requested on both versions of the beads task. The study
therefore demonstrates that it is possible to change the
data gathering of people with delusions, in the short
term. The change was greater on the 60:40 version of
the beads task. Why was there a difference in training
effects on the 2 tasks? It could be that the training was
onlyweaklyeffective, or itmight be explainedbythe level
of difficulty of the 2 tasks. The 85:15 task is much easier
Table 5. Jumping to Conclusions Pre- and Postrandomization
Task
Before Randomization
After intervention
Not JTC JTC
Training group 60:40 task
Not JTC 8 0
JTC 1 8
Training group 85:15 task
Not JTC 5 1
JTC 1 10
Control 60:40 task
Not JTC 6 1
JTC 1 9
Control 85:15 task
Not JTC 7 1
JTC 0 9
Note: JTC, jumping to conclusions.
Table 6. Belief Flexibility Pre- and Postrandomization Condition
Belief
Flexibility
Training Condition (n = 17) Control Condition (n = 17)
Pre Post Pre Post
Response to hypothetical contradiction
Dismisses belief 0 (0%) 1 (5.9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Changes conviction 7 (41.2%) 7 (41.2%) 3 (17.6%) 3 (17.6%)
Accommodates 4 (23.5%) 2 (11.7%) 2 (11.8%) 1 (5.9%)
Ignores or rejects 6 (35.3%) 7 (41.2%) 12 (70.6%) 13 (76.5%)
Possibility mistaken
Yes 5 (29.4%) 7 (41.2%) 4 (23.5%) 4 (23.5%)
No 12 (70.6%) 10 (58.8%) 13 (76.5%) 13 (76.5%)
Alternative explanations
None 14 13 15 14
One 3 4 2 3
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a small number of draws. There is less objective benefit in
delaying a decision on the 85:15 task because it is clear at
averyearlystagewhichjarhasbeenchosen,anddelaying
the decision is unlikely to increase accuracy. The 60:40
task is more difficult because the ratio of the beads in
the 2 jars is very similar, and delaying a decision is
morebeneficialinreachingacorrectsolution.Thecentral
theme of the training that gathering information is help-
ful has more relevance to the more difficult version of the
beads task.
An interesting finding adds a note of caution to inter-
pretingthetrainingeffects.Althoughtherewasanoverall
group mean increase of about 50% in the number of
beads requested on the beads task from pre- to posttrain-
ing, the numbers of participants showing the extreme
JTC bias remained consistent. On average, all partici-
pants in the intervention group improved, compared
with the controls, but the amount of improvement was
dependent on their baseline measurement. The effect
was much smaller in those with the extreme bias. As
noted in the introduction, a prior JTC bias has recently
been found to moderate change in response to antipsy-
chotic medication
27; in this study, a prior JTC bias mod-
erated the effects of reasoning training. It was clear that
trainingimproveddatagatheringmoreamongthoseindi-
viduals with delusions who did not show the JTC bias at
theoutset.ThisleadstotheconclusionthatJTCinpeople
with delusions is a strong bias that is somewhat unre-
sponsive to only a brief training intervention.
We were also interested in the effects of reasoning
training on thinking about delusions and on delusional
conviction. This is of theoretical importance because if
a reasoning bias contributes to delusion formation and
maintenance, as hypothesized, reversing this bias should
have an impact on delusional thinking.
16 It also provides
a test of a general effect of the training in addition to
training participants in gathering data. Our delusion
group at baseline had little belief flexibility and very
high levels of conviction in their beliefs. It should be
noted that the training content at no point considered de-
lusion-relevant material nor were the individual’s delu-
sions ever discussed. We were specifically interested in
examining whether a focus on general reasoning strate-
gies might generalize to affect thinking about delusions,
thereby providing some further evidence for a causal role
of reasoning in delusions. After training, 24% (n = 4)
showed greater belief flexibility and 18% (n = 3) some re-
duction in delusional conviction. In contrast, only one
patient in the control group showed a change in belief
flexibility, and none changed at all in conviction. Al-
though only preliminary, this is an indication both of
a causal role and of the potential benefits for delusions
of reasoning training, suggesting that change in data
gathering and reasoning strategies might indeed mediate
change in delusional thinking. A larger study, powered
for this, could be designed to examine this mediation
hypothesis. We therefore conclude that this approach,
if further developed, has promise for intervening with
delusions.
Thestudyhadanumberoflimitations.First, itwasun-
derpoweredtodeterminewhetherchangesinbeliefflexibil-
ityordelusionalconvictionarestatisticallysignificantorto
undertakeformalstatisticaltestsofmediation.Thesedata
indicate that sample sizes of approximately 50 people in
each condition would be needed to have sufficient power
to detect whether the benefits of this brief training on de-
lusional conviction are significant. Larger sample sizes
would also make it less likely that there are chance differ-
ences in the participants randomized to the 2 conditions
(although the groups did appear to be reasonably similar
onclinicalanddemographicvariablesinthepresentstudy,
with the exception of in- or outpatient status).
Secondly, the results indicate that the effects of this
particular brief training are limited. As noted, we used
neutral training materials that did not feature the beads
task or the content of delusions in order to investigate the
effects of changing a general reasoning strategy. There
may be better methods to encourage more data gathering
and to develop reasoning strategies that will impact on
delusional thinking. It is possible that a lengthier training
package,withafocus ongeneralizingtodelusional think-
ing, which proceeds from the engaging materials used in
the current study to stimuli related to interpersonal judg-
ments and then to materials more directly relevant to the
content of delusions, such as interpersonal threat, may
haveagreaterimpactonthemoreextremeJTCreasoning
bias and on belief flexibility and delusional conviction.
This sort of intervention could be carried out over a short
course and the longer term effects to evaluate durability
of change assessed. Consistent with this, a pilot study of
the MCT package
42 from which this intervention was
partially derived, delivered over 8 sessions, and has
reported some encouraging preliminary data of signifi-
cant changes in positive symptoms.
50 Thirdly, outcomes
in this study were not examined by a rater blind to con-
dition. Finally, in the current study, we did not investi-
gate any specific hypotheses about the mechanisms
underlying JTC. It is, for example, possible that cognitive
deficits, such as executive function or working memory,
might contribute to this bias.
29 Future studies might ex-
amine both the relationship of JTC to cognitive impair-
ment and also address whether reasoning training has
effects on improvements in cognitive function, such as at-
tention or other aspects of cognition, which might con-
tribute to improvements in reasoning. Furthermore, the
relationship of JTC with IQ is not clear, although most
studies have not found that it is strongly associated.
16
This study used a common but limited abbreviated mea-
sure of IQ and thus does not provide a thorough exami-
nation of this question. Studies that aim to increase the
understanding of the mechanisms are also likely to help
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treating delusions.
In conclusion, research in recent years has shown that
a number of psychological processes are associated with
delusions; the challenge now is to develop more effective
psychological interventions based on this new knowl-
edge. The findings of this study point to one promising
new approach.
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